Thomas to Halleck: "I have made my last protest while the war lasts. You may hereafter put a stick over me if  you choose to do so. I will take care, however, to so manage my command, whatever it may be, as not to be involved in the mistakes of the stick."

After the defeat of the Union army at Chickamauga, which was saved from being a complete rout only by the improbable stand of Thomas against Bragg's entire army (25,000 against 60,000), Rosecrans fortified Chattanooga, abandoning the heights of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge to Bragg. Rosecrans was thus safe for the moment, but his supply situation was critical and got worse.

For various reasons (chaos also in the Confederate supply situation, horrendous losses at Chickamauga, strong fortifications around Chattanooga) Bragg decided to starve Rosecrans out rather than attack whereby it wasn't exactly clear, who was besieging whom. Bragg was also occupied with trying to clean out all of the insubordinate elements in his army who had contributed greatly to limit his options before this battle, indeed since his first foray into Kentucky. At this moment, one of the most insubordinate elements was Longstreet, the savior from the East. He had arrived the night before the battle of Chickamauga, expecting Davis to sooner or later name him Bragg's replacement, and after the battle he jumped feet first into the rebellion among Bragg's officers, aligning himself against Bragg, of course. But then Davis came to Chickamauga, listened, saw, and stuck with Bragg.

Bragg tried to placate Longstreet by giving him the responsibility for the entire left flank (Chattanooga Valley, Lookout Mountain, Lookout Valley, and beyond), but Longstreet was not to be mollified. He displayed complete indifference to his charge, disobeyed Bragg's order to throw back Hazen (who had effected the crossing at Brown's Ferry on 27 Oct.), and disobeyed Bragg's order to use "all necessary force" to oppose Hooker who had entered Lookout Valley from the West on 28 Oct. with a mixed corps. Instead, Longstreet ordered an improvised  night attack by a division against Hooker's rear guard - a division at Wauhatchie under Geary. This accomplished nothing, and Hooker was there to stay as long as he wanted. This stabilized the line of supply from the Nashville railroad to Stevenson, Ala., from there via steamboat to Kelley's Ferry, and on to Chattanooga via the easy wagon and RR route past Raccoon Mountain to Brown's Ferry - the "cracker line". Having thrown away Bragg's entire left flank, Longstreet then lobbied with Davis in order to be sent back to Virginia, promising to stop on the way and chase Burnside out of Knoxville.* Davis so ordered, and Bragg concurred, wanting to be rid of Longstreet anyway, and hoping the threat to Burnside would draw away some of Grant's forces from Chattanooga.

For Grant had arrived on 23 Oct. Thomas, on 19 Oct., had taken over the command of the Army of the Cumberland from Rosecrans who had not recovered from the debacle at Chickamauga. Thomas began immediately reorganizing the army and solving the supply problem (following a plan worked out by Baldy Smith and Rosecrans). Grant approved of the plan which was already underway. Meanwhile Grant was preparing his own plan which was designed to highlight Sherman as the agent  of the victory in the coming battle against Bragg, with all due reflection upon himself as the architect thereof. At this time Sherman was slowly approaching Chattanooga from western Tennessee with Grant's former army, the Army of the Tennessee, now Sherman's (Grant had been promoted to Cmdr. of the Division of the Mississippi).

However, Thomas and Grant didn't like each other very much. Grant felt uncertain of himself in Thomas's presence, seeing in him the only possible rival for overall command. On the other hand, Thomas didn't like Grant's improvised way of doing battle. Moreover, Thomas didn't really need Grant's help to deal with Bragg. For a complete summary of this situation see my article "Politics in the Union Army at the Battle for Chattanooga". Grant's hidden or not so hidden agenda (promote Sherman, get himself called East to take on Lee, open other paths to success after the war) was therefore in conflict with that of Thomas who  merely wanted to decisively defeat Bragg and shorten the war.
 

In a nutshell, Sherman arrived late and performed incredibly badly in his task of taking the northern end of Missionary Ridge. This series of lapses allowed Thomas to shift his effort to where he wanted to make it in the beginning, namely against Bragg's southern flank at Rossville Gap. According to Grant's plan, Hooker was to be held in reserve, and maybe demonstrate a little bit, and Thomas was only to demonstrate and then join Sherman in his victory march down the ridge. Sherman's delay enabled Thomas to get "permission" for Hooker to attack Lookout Mountain on 24 Nov.

Hooker at Lookout Mountain. Original 30' x 13' painting by James Walker on display at Point Park Visitor's Center in Chattanooga. Click on image to enlarge.

While Sherman was crossing the Tennessee and occupying the northern and practically undefended end of Missionary Ridge,** Hooker took Lookout Mountain. Sherman's botched reconnaissance (resulting in his stopping far short of his objective in his orders - the railroad tunnel -  on the afternoon of 24 Nov.) allowed Thomas to get orders for Hooker to attack Rossville Gap on the next day.

The afternoon of 25 Oct., while Sherman was being defeated piecemeal by Cleburne (who had less than a quarter of the forces that Sherman had), Hooker took Rossville Gap and sent troops in 3 columns north toward Bragg's headquarters on Missionary Ridge. Osterhaus (Sherman's  division stranded on the south side of the Tennessee by a break in a pontoon bridge and then borrowed by Hooker), even got around far to the rear of Bragg's position and probably started the panic in Southern ranks which then helped Thomas's troops to break the Bragg's center in 6 places during the famous charge up the ridge. Maybe it started even earlier as they watched Hooker with 12,000 men or so cross the valley unopposed toward their left flank and their road back home if he so chose.

This charge began as Grant's order for a limited demonstration in order to draw away pressure from Sherman. Thomas's troops were supposed to advance to the foot of the ridge "take the rifle pits" and stop - a really bad order because the soldiers would have been directly exposed to defending fire from above. In various ways, Thomas stalled the execution of this order until he knew that Hooker was around behind Bragg. When the troops did take the rifle pits, they continued the charge up to the crest (4 to 500 feet above the flats, inclination up to 45%), and broke through. There is dispute among historians concerning whether this charge was spontaneous, whether the various division and brigade commanders were simply confused, or whether Thomas had in some way ordered the movement beyond the rifle pits behind Grant's back. The division commander Baird on the Federal center right and August Willich (under Wood in the center and one of the first brigade commanders to reach the top) wrote in their reports that their orders were to take the crest. Who gave this order?

Grant didn't. Grant's reaction to the charge up the ridge, described as being everything from mild surprise to cursing and rage, proves with certainty that he had not ordered the charge and decidedly did not want it. Grant had proven already, and would prove again many times later, that he was not particularly motivated by a desire to keep as many of his men alive as possible in battle. The main reason for his displeasure, aside from his habitual reaction to any perceived infraction of his orders, was the fear that the charge might succeed. That not Sherman , but Thomas would win the battle (and get the credit).

Afterward, Grant, Sherman, Halleck, and Dana did the next best thing and rewrote the history of the battle, making Sherman's failure into a successful holding operation, turning Thomas's charge into a miracle (i.e. one-time fluke), and negating almost altogether Hooker's turning of Bragg's left flank. For a couple of hours Hooker simply disappeared into some sort of black hole in Rossville according to Grant's report.

After the battle, Thomas's Army of the Cumberland was incorporated into Sherman's Army of the Tennessee, and Sherman was put in charge of the drive toward Atlanta (see the Hundred Days campaign). It didn't hurt him that his brother was US senator from Ohio, nor that his father-in-law was a former senator.

* Burnside did a good job at Knoxville, paid Longstreet back for Fredericksburg.
** According to local historian and head of the Missionary Ridge neighborhood association Bob Graham, this first detached hill of Missionary Ridge received its name "Billy the Goat Hill" after the battle.

Other articles on this battle:

1. "Politics in the Union Army at the Battle for Chattanooga" by Bob Redman

2.

1) Fact: The morning of the 25th there was communication between Thomas on Orchard Knob and signalmen on Lookout Mountain because this was how Thomas sent his orders to Hooker at about 9:30 once the fog had lifted. Is it possible that these signalmen, who were in a perfect position to observe Hooker's movements across the valley, did not keep Thomas informed of Hooker's further progress that day? Is it possible that Grant, no more than 20 yards away from Thomas the afternoon of the 25th (Orchard Knob wouldn't permit a greater distance), was not also so informed?

2) Fact: Thomas in his official report of the battle states that on 24 Nov. Hooker "reported by telegraph" that he had defeated the Confederate defenders at Craven's house on Lookout Mountain. Hooker’s battle report also mentions telegraph communications. Who cut the telegraph wire on the 25th?

3) Fact: Hooker was known to be extraordinarily ambitious. He was especially motivated to wipe out the stain of Chancerllorsville. What then held Hooker back at the foot of Lookout Mountain the morning of 25 Nov. until 10 AM?

4) Fact: Stewart’s artillery started firing at Hooker sometime around 1 PM. Hooker got his artillery across Chattanooga Creek around 2 PM and started using it then (at the very latest) against Stewart. Is it possible that Thomas and Grant, Bragg and Breckinridge, Confederate grunt up on the ridge and Union grunt down on the flats didn't hear this cannonfire and the other attendant racket?

5) Facts: the western face of the ridge was mostly cleared for field of fire, the upper Chattanooga valley was a mixture of cultivated fields and forest, and there were no leaves on the hardwood trees. Bragg reports that he saw at about 11 AM "masses of troops coming from Lookout" and heading "toward his front”. Could the Confederate grunts up on the ridge not also see Hooker proceeding unopposed across the valley toward their road back home?

6) Fact as reported by Sword: August Willich, a German born and Prussian trained general officer of Wood's division situated right in front of Orchard Knob, stated afterward that he had understood that, according to his orders, he was to "advance" after reaching the rifle pits. Is it likely that such a person would have misconstrued the order as issued by Grant? Did he then receive a different order, and if so, from whom and through whom?

7) Fact as reported by Cozzens: After Grant's second verbal order to Thomas to have his men move to the rifle pits and stop, Thomas and Gordon Granger (the man who had saved Thomas at Chickamauga) conferred alone for a few minutes, whereupon Granger "went off". What did Thomas say to Granger?

8) Fact as reported by Cozzens: After Grant's second order to take the rifle pits, still nothing happened, whereupon Grant ordered the movement a third time, and the machinery started into motion. Where did Granger go and to whom did he talk between Grant's 2nd and 3rd enunciations of the order?

9) Fact: Grant's order for Thomas to have his men "demonstrate" toward the rifle pits and stop would have, if rigidly adhered to, exposed these troops to grave danger because of the plunging fire. Was Thomas the sort of man to not intervene in some way in order to mitigate the effect of such an order?

10) Fact: Many writers call this order on the part of Grant "foolish" or "ill-considered" or even "quixotic". Was not Grant anything but foolish, and did he not normally reflect on his orders, and isn't the word quixotic an unusual term to describe the behavior of the mature general Grant?

11) Observation: There is an amazing congruity between the chronology of Hooker's progress against the Confederate left flank and the chronology of Grant's repeated ordering of Thomas to move against the rifle pits AND STOP. Is this a coincidence?

12) Fact: According to Sword, some of the official communications of the afternoon of 25 Nov. between Grant and Sherman are missing from the Official Records. Is it possible they were removed, and if so, by whom?

13) Fact as reported by many of the officers of Stewart's Divisions' battle reports (Broadfoot’s Supplements to the OR) show that the Confederate retreat began first in his division under the attack from Hooker, before Tucker gave way in the center. Why does Grant state in his battle report, and then again in his Memoirs, that Hooker was held up for four hours at Chattanooga Creek and did not meet the expectations placed in him?

14) Fact: From any elevated point within the former Federal perimeter, one can clearly see the two notches (through which pass today Campbell St. and Lightfoot Mill Road) delineating the northern and southern limits of Tunnel Hill. Why couldn't Sherman, who in his “Memoirs” reports having gone to Ft. Wood, see this?

15) Fact: From various points along Hixon Pike on the northern bank of the Tennessee, you can see the the depressions marking the limits of Tunnel Hill. On 7 Nov. from a hill in that area opposite the mouth of South Chickamauga Creek (probably today’s River Hills) Baldy Smith and Thomas did see the campfires on Missionary Ridge. What did Sherman see the afternoon of 16 Nov. when he made his reconnaissance outing to this same spot?

16) Fact: Sherman cited "wrongly laid down maps" which led him to think that Billygoat Hill was Tunnel Hill. Did such defective maps exist, and, if so, to what extent were they defective? Why did Sherman not include the defective maps in his battle report?

17) Fact: Thomas had the most extensive “secret service” of any army of the war. Many specialists were employed in this service, including professional topographical engineers who provided information for Thomas’s famous topographical books. What were these engineers doing during the 2 months between the battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga?

18) Fact: Grant in his orders to Thomas of 18 Nov. complains obliquely about "not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places". Why would Grant, after having spent 3 weeks at Chattanooga, admit to any discerning reader of his order that he couldn't get the information he wanted from Thomas? Was he, in fact, hinting at something else?

19) Fact according to Baldy Smith, Thomas’s chief engineer: There were scientifically prepared and accurate survey maps of the area in Thomas's HQ. Why didn't Grant  ask for a more detailed map if he wanted one, and if he did ask, why didn't he get one? Why would he begin a battle without one?

20) Observation: Grant's behavior in Chattanooga was inconsistent with the common description of him as being modest and unassuming. His subsequent battle report was inconsistent with the common description of him as being honest. Was not Grant as ambitious and occasionally as unscrupulous as many another top commander in this and any other war?

  Die Schlacht um Chattanooga 23, 24, und 25 Nov. 63

Diese Schlacht war eigentlich Teil einer außerordentlich komplexen Serie von Ereignissen, angefangen mit oder sogar vor der Chickamauga-Schlacht (die ich aussondere und getrennt behandele).

Nach der Niederlage von Rosecrans' Armee zu Chickamauga, die vor der Vernichtung nur durch den einmaligen Stand von Thomas (25,000 gegen 60,000) gerettet wurde, befestigte sich Rosecrans in Chattanooga, indem er auf die herumliegenden Höhen von Lookout Mountain und Missionary Ridge verzichtete. Rosecrans lief also vorübergehend keine Gefahr, aber seine Versorgungslage wurde schnell kritisch, da die besten Straßen nach Chattanooga fast ringsherum unter konföderierten Kontrolle lagen.

Es ging jedoch der Armee von Bragg kaum besser. Es herrschte Chaos im konföderierten Versorgungssystem. Das Furage-Gebiet für Bragg lag weit weg im Süden, während die Erträge von den ihm umliegenden Gebieten alle nach Virginia und Lee gingen. Bragg mußte sich auch von Chickamauga erholen, und die Befestigungen von Chattanooga waren stark und wurden noch stärker. Bragg richtete sich also auf eine Belagerung ein, wobei nicht sicher war, wer wen belagerte. Bragg war auch damit beschäftigt, sich von den ungehorsamen Generälen zu befreien, die ihn so sehr behindert hatten vor der letzten Schlacht oder eigentlich seit seinem ersten Einzug in Kentucky ein. Das schlimmste Element diesbezüglich war der neulich hinzugekommene Longstreet, der Retter in der Not aus dem Osten, der sich nach der Chickamauga-Schlacht mit Gusto in die internen Zerwürfnisse der Army of Tennessee hineinwarf, und zwar im Einklang mit Braggs Gegnern. Er kam dorthin in der Erwartung, Bragg zu ersetzen. Nur hatte Bragg keine freie Hand gegen diese Leute, und auch die nicht gegen ihn. Davis kam Ende September 1863 nach Chattanogga um zu sichten und schlichten, und er blieb bei Bragg. Polk und Hindman wurden versetzt, aber Longstreet wurde praktisch und ungern zu Braggs Stellvertreter. Bragg versuchte Longstreet zufrieden zu stellen, indem er ihm die Verantwortung für den ganzen linken Flügel übertrug, aber Longstreet kümmerte sich wenig darum in den folgenden Wochen. Als Hazen 28 Okt. Brown's Ferry in Lookout Valley besetzte, befahl Bragg Longstreet, diesen frischen Stützpunkt zu unterbinden. Longstreet tat nichts. Nichts. Als am folgenden Tag das Korps von Hooker (Verstärkung von der Potomac-Armee) in Lookout Valley ankam, befahl Bragg Longsreet wieder, "mit allen notwendigen Kräften" Hooker vom Tal zu vertreiben. Stattdessen ordnete er einen improvisierten nächtlichen Einfall von einer Division gegen Hookers Nachhut in Wauhatchie an, der jedoch fehlschlug. Hooker saß also fest an Braggs linkem Flügel, und die Versorgungsprobleme der Union in Chattanooga waren gelöst. Nachdem Longstreet auf diese Weise den linken Flügel zum Teufel hingeschmissen hatte, fädelte er Davis in Richmond den Plan ein, wonach er mit seinem 18,000 Mann starken Korps 160 km nach Knoxville ziehen sollte, um dort Burnside rauszuschmeißen. Davis willigte ein, und Bragg war auch einverstanden, froh Longstreet loszuwerden und hoffend, Unionsstreifkräfte würden dann auch von Chattanooga in Richtung Knoxville abgezogen. Weder das eine noch das Andere geschah. Burnside wehrte nachher Longstreet fast mühelos ab, und er tat das ohne Verstärkung von Thomas, der am 19. Okt. 63 das Kommando der Army of the Cumberland von Rosecrans übernommen hatte.

Thomas löste sofort das Versorgungsproblem, indem er den schon von Rosecrans und "Baldy" Smith vorbereiteten Brown's Ferry Plan ausführte. Er reorganisierte auch die Armee von Grund auf, nur hatte er freie Hand dabei, und all die Generäle, die zu Chickamauga die Flucht ergriffen hatten, wurden ersetzt. Am 23. Okt. kam auch Grant an. Grant hatte seinen eigenen Plan mitgebracht, wonach Sherman bei der kommenden Schlacht zum Sieg und Grant zum großen Architekt dessen verholfen werden sollten. Grant war nach dem komischen Sieg in Vicksburg zum Oberbefehlshaber im Westen ernannt worden, und Sherman, nunmehr Chef von Grants früherer Army of the Tennesse, kam nun langsam langsam auch nach Chattanooga.

Jedoch Grant und Thomas mochten sich nicht sehr. Grant war verunsichert durch Thomas, da Thomas der einzig mögliche Rivale für die Gesamtführung der Unionsarmeen war. Anderseits gefiel dem Thomas Grants Hang zur Improvisation nicht. Ferner brauchte Thomas weder Grants Hilfe noch seine Anwesenheit, um mit Bragg fertig zu werden. Für eine detaillierte Analyse dieser Situation soll man meinen Artikel "Politics in the Union Army at the Battle for Chattanooga" lesen. Grants versteckte oder nicht ganz verteckte Agenden (Sherman befördern, sich nach dem Osten zum Antritt gegen Lee rufen lassen, sich andere Bahnen für nach dem Krieg offen halten usw.) standen jedoch im direkten Konflikt mit dem Vorsatz von Thomas, der lediglich Bragg entscheidend schlagen und den Krieg verkürzen wollte.

Kurz, Sherman kam verspätet an und vermasselte dann regelrecht seinen Angriff gegen das Nordende von Missionary Ridge. In der Tat ließ er sich durch Cleburne mit weniger als einem Viertel der Streikräfte nicht nur zum Stehen bringen, sondern zurücktreiben. Die Fehler von Sherman an dem Tag gehen auf keine Kuhhaut, um mich der alten Phrase zu bedienen. Indem Grants Plan allmählich scheiterte, konnte Thomas den eigenen Plan zur Geltung bringen, wonach Hooker den südlichen Flügel auseinandernehman sollte, was er auch am 24. und am 25. Nov. tat. Gemäß Grants Plan sollte der ihm noch unbliebtere (weil großmäulig) aber auch meistens kompetente Hooker in der Reserve bleiben, vielleicht ein bißchen demonstrieren. Thomas in der Mitte sollte Bragg nur ablenken und sich anschließend Shermans Siegesmarsch entlang dem Missionary Ridge gesellen. Als all das fehlschlug, blieb nur Hooker übrig, und Thomas durfte ihn gemäß seinem eigenen und ursprünglichen Plan einschalten. Am 24. Nov., während sich Sherman langsam langsam auf das Südufer des Tennessee-Flusses übersetzte, nahm Hooker auf spektakuläre Weise Lookout Mountain, zwar gegen geschwächte Opposition, denn Longstreets Korps war längst weg. Weil Sherman sehr flüchtige Aufklärung gemacht hatte, wußte er nicht genau, wo er am 25. war, auf jeden Fall war er ziemlich weit weg von dem Objektiv seiner Befehle, und nun durfte Hooker weiter machen und Rossville Gap, die sehr schwach besetzte südliche Flanke von Braggs Linie auf Missionary Ridge, angreifen, was er auch tat.

Wie praktisch nur in den Berichten von der Division von Stewart (der das Kommando über Braggs südlichen Flügel führte und dessen Berichte mehr als 120 Jahre verschollen bzw. ungeachtet blieben) zu lesen ist, weil nachher die Geschichte dieser Schlacht weitgehend durch Grant und Co. verfälscht wurde, zerfiel zuerst dieser Teil von Braggs Verteidigungslinie, kurz bevor die berühmte und "spontane" Attacke hügelaufwärts gegen die Mitte durch 4 Divisionen unter Thomas den Durchbruch erzielte.

Diese Attacke begann als ein Befehl von Grant für eine begrenzte Demonstration, um Druck von dem steckengebliebenen Sherman wegzuziehen. Demnach sollten Thomas' Leute nur den Fuß von Missionary Ridge einnehmen, und dort unter dem direkten Feuer von oben stehen bleiben. Auf verschiedene Weise hat Thomas es gewußt, die Ausführung dieses mörderischen Befehls zu verhindern, bis er sicher war, daß Hooker seine Arbeit geleistet hatte.

Als die 4 Divisionen noch unter Thomas an dem Tag die konföderierten Stellungen am Fuße des Berges einnahmen, gingen sie weiter und erklimmten die ein paar Hundert Meter gegen die bis zu 45%-er Steigung, bis sie oben durchbrachen. Einer der ersten oben war Willich. Aber dort oben war es schon morsch geworden, erst beim bloßen Anblick von Hookers unbehindertem Vormarsch am Vormittag, und dann durch die beginnende Panik bei der Ankunft von Osterhaus fast hinter Braggs Hauptquartier in der Mitte von Missionary Ridge. Braggs Soldaten entschieden sich, ihre Armee zu retten, wenn Bragg sich dazu nicht entschließen konnte.

Es wird oft behauptet, diese Attacke war spontan. Nur wußten viele der Brigadenbefehlshaber nichts davon. Der rote August Willich war einer davon, und er schrieb in seinem Bericht nacher, daß er ausdrücklichen Befehl hatte, den Gipfel zu bestürmen. Nur kam dieser Befehl von Grant nicht, denn als er sah, wie die Unionssoldaten weiter machten als er befohlen hatte, fing er gemäß fast allen Augenzeugen zu toben an. Grant hatte oft genug bewiesen, und würde es widerholt nachher beweisen, daß er sich nicht besonders an hohen Verlusten störte. Der Grund für seine Rage war die Einsicht, daß nicht Sherman, sondern Thomas den großen Sieg einheimsen könnte, und das lag nicht in seinem Plan.

Nachher haben Grant & Co. das Nächstbeste getan und die Geschichte der Schlacht, mit der Hilfe von Halleck und Dana, umgeschrieben. Demgemäß hat Sherman erfolgreich Bragg beim einen Bein gehalten, Thomas hat durch ein (einmaliges) Wunder die Mitte durchbrochen, und Hooker verschwand stundenlang in einem schwarzen Loch vor Rossville. Anschließend wurde Sherman zum Oberbefehlshaber für die Atlanta-Kampagne befördert, und Thomas und seine Army of the Cumberland wurden Sherman unterstellt. Liebe Leser, ich übertreibe hier nicht. Habe ich übrigens erwähnt, daß der Bruder von Sherman zu dieser Zeit US-Senator von Ohio war, und sein Schwiegervater ehemaliger US-Senator?

Wer Englisch liest, soll sich mit den obigen "20 questions" befassen, die ich in meinem Artikel zu antworten versuche, da andere Autoren darauf nicht eingehen.