From Bragg's report: "We were now back against the mountains, in a country affording us nothing, with a long line of railroad to protect, and half a dozen passes on the right and left by which our rear could be gained. In this position it was perfectly practicable for the enemy to destroy our means of crossing the Tennessee, and thus secure our ultimate destruction without a battle. Having failed to bring him to that issue, so much desired by myself and troops, I reluctantly yielded to the necessity imposed by my position and inferior strength, and put the army in motion for the Tennessee River."

After the battle of Murfreesboro (30 Dec. 62, 2 Jan. 63) Rosecrans established his winter camp there. Bragg withdrew south and prepared a defensive line north of Tullahoma which was to block any Federal advance on Chattanooga. Rosecrans prepared thoroughly for the coming battle by stockpiling supplies and training the troops. His biggest problem were his inferior cavalry forces. The solution to this problem was tossed into his lap by a volunteer named Col. USV John T. Wilder, a foundry owner from Indiana, who came to Rosecrans with a revolutionary idea: take infantry, mount them on horses, arm them with the brand new 7-round Spencer repeating rifle, and use them as mobile shock troops who would ride ahead, dismount, and use their tremendous firepower to attack the enemy in the rear with the force of a much larger body of conventionally armed infantry. Rosecrans listened and gave Wilder the approval to round up the horses. Wilder made an arrangement with his bank so that the members of his brigade would pay the purchase price ($35 dollars per rifle) in installments out of their monthly pay. In the plan for dealing with Bragg, Wilder was assigned to Thomas.

Rosecrans refused to budge until he was ready. That he turned out later to have been right did not contribute to endearing him to Halleck. At the risk of his military career Rosecrans was carefully preparing a plan to utilize the revolutionary tool which Wilder had put in his hands. The plan was both audacious and complex involving 4 separate attack columns, and it went off like clockwork, in spite of incessant rain and bad roads, thanks to the months of preparation and training and, according to Bradley, just the right amount of improvisation. On the Federal right Granger and his cavalry demonstrated toward the fortified town of Shelbyville. In the  middle McCook and Thomas threatened the passes, and on the left Crittenden threatened McMinnville. Granger's movement on 23 June was a feint (rendered more convincing by the presence of most of Rosecrans' cavalry), because Rosecrans had no intention of directly attacking the fortifications. On the other side of his line on the left, Crittenden was feinting at a feint according to Woodworth, that is, it was supposed to be recognized as being not the main thrust, thus diverting attention back to Granger on the right in front of Shelbyville.

Then the main thrust with the 14th corps under Thomas took place on 24 June. First Wilder's newly mounted "lightning" brigade (with the firepower of a division) stormed through Hoover's Gap and so overwhelmed the forces under Wheeler's cavalry that they weren't able even send messages back to Bragg about what had happened. Never before in the history of warfare had so much firepower covered 12 miles so quickly. Wilder was thus able to establish himself beyond the southern mouth of the gap and await Thomas's infantry. When Thomas arrived, he said to Wilder that his action had prevented 2000 casualties.

Hardee, just to the west of Hoover's Gap, knew only that huge force had suddenly appeared on his right flank. He supposed it might be almost Rosecrans's entire army, and he retreated without orders from Bragg (whom Hardee despised) into Tullahoma. This forced the withdrawal of the other elements of Bragg's army into Tullahoma. On 28 June Hardee and Bishop Lenoidas Polk (Davis's favorite who constantly fomented rebellion against Bragg) advised in guarded and less guarded terms to abandon Tullahoma. The next day Bragg's army began its withdrawal to Chattanooga.

At the price of about 500 casualties Rosecrans swept forward 100 miles and was set to permanently establish a Federal presence on the all-important trunk line from Virginia to Memphis. To take Chattanooga (the door to the deep South), Rosecrans first had to get there, and get there he would.

This battle does not receive much attention and has little attraction for those who thrill to high body counts. All the more reason for discerning students of history to give this masterpiece of planning and execution its due consideration. If you want to get a feel for how much fun it is to be the object of "soft war", read the reports of Bragg, Polk, and Cleburne.

Battle reports:
1. Rosecrans US
2. Thomas US
3. WilderUS
4. Bragg CS
5. Polk CS
6. Cleburne CS

Other articles on this battle:

1. Thomas Van Horne on the Tullahoma campaign

2. excerpt from Manoeuvring Bragg out ot Tennessee by Gilbert C. Kniffen, Lieutenant-Colonel, USV

Page 99
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During the first six months of the year 1863 the Army of the Cumberland remained at Murfreesboro' and was comparatively inactive. The troops were employed in the construction of elaborate fortifications and in divers minor operations with defensive or tentative objects.
 

Page 100 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.

Early in January the provisional corps, "Right Wing," "Centre" and "Left Wing," were changed to permanent corps d'armee. The " Right Wing " became the Twentieth corps, the "Centre" the Fourteenth corps, and the "Left Wing" the Twenty-first corps, commanded, as before, respectively by Generals McCook, Thomas and Crittenden. The Fourteenth corps, as finally constituted, comprised four divisions, designated as first, second, third, and fourth, commanded respectively by Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau, Major General J. S. Negley, Brigadier-General J. M. Brannan, and Major-General J. J. Reynolds.

In this period of inaction at Murfreesboro' it was common for officers of all grades to obtain leaves of absence to visit their homes, and trips to Nashville were frequent. But the course of General Thomas illustrated his idea of the duty of an officer holding an important command. The months were passing slowly by and weary at last of monotony and inaction, he asked permission to go to Nashville for a day. There was at the time no prospect of operations, offensive or defensive, for his command, and consequently there was no need of his presence at Murfreesboro'. He nevertheless, upon reflection, declined to go, because his reason for asking for a day's leave had been a personal one. Besides it was possible, he thought, though not at all probable, that an action of some kind might take place in his absence. This extreme view of duty was frequently illustrated in his public and private life. He was not "off duty" a single day during the war.

Late in June the Army of the Cumberland advanced against its old enemy, the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, then holding the line of Duck River. In this movement the Fourteenth corps was in the centre, its appropriate place, and drove the enemy from Hoover's Gap and from several positions in front of that gap. General McCook on the right had a severe combat at Liberty Gap, but finally pressed the enemy from the hills. Gen. Crittenden on the left did not
 
 

Page 101 - TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN

meet much opposition. When Bragg's army had been driven from its defensive line on Duck River, Gen. Rosecrans moved his army towards Manchester, and regarding this movement as indicating either an attack upon his position at Tullahoma, or the interruption of his communications, Bragg fell back from that place. He did not consider himself strong enough to meet Rosecrans in battle, and he consequently retreated first to the Cumberland Mountains, and soon after, across the Tennessee River to Chattanooga. The Tullahoma campaign was begun on the 23^rd of June and terminated on the 4^th of July. The enemy fought at the gaps of the mountains, but the defense on the whole was feeble. The result was the possession by the Army of the Cumberland of the region from Murfreesboro' to Bridgeport, Alabama.

At the close of the campaign the army advanced to the northern base of the Cumberland Mountains, and there halted to make preparations for a campaign south of the Tennessee River.

[scanned, reformatted and corrected; maps and illustrations are ommitted]

Page 635

excerpt from MANOEUVRING BRAGG OUT OF TENNESSEE
BY GILBERT C. KNIFFIN, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, U. S. V.

The brief campaign which resulted in forcing the Confederate army to evacuate their works at Tullahoma and Shelbyville, Tenn., and retire behind the Tennessee River, began on the 23d of June, was prosecuted in the midst of drenching rains, and terminated July 4th, 1863. Both armies had occupied the time since the battle of Stone's River in recruiting their strength and in fortifying their respective positions. Murfreesboro' was Rosecrans's secondary base of supplies, while Tullahoma was Bragg's barrier against Rosecrans's farther advance toward Chattanooga, the strategic importance of which, as controlling Confederate railroad communication between the East and West, had rendered it the objective point of all the campaigns of the armies of the Ohio and the Cumberland.

As the contending armies stood facing each other on the 20th of June, 1863, General Bragg estimated the effective strength of his army at 30,449 infantry, 13,962 cavalry, and 2254 artillery. Polk and Hardee commanded his two corps of infantry, and Wheeler and Forrest the cavalry.

Deducting the garrisons of Nashville and points

Page 636

north, and the Reserve Corps, 12,575, to be used in emergency, Rosecrans had at the same date "present for duty, equipped," 40,746 infantry, 6806 cavalry, and 3065 artillery, for an offensive campaign. Having received full and accurate descriptions of the fortifications at Tullahoma, where a part of Polk's corps was intrenched behind formidable breastworks, protected by an abatis of fallen trees six hundred yards in width, and at Shelbyville, where Hardee had fortified his position with equal engineering skill, General Rosecrans determined to force the Confederate army out of its works, and if possible engage it in the open field. A glance at the map will show Shelbyville directly south of Murfreesboro', and Tullahoma, on the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, eighteen miles south-east. The high state of cultivation of the country west of Shelbyville, and the connection of the towns by broad turnpike roads, would naturally suggest the route of march for the Union army; moreover, the region to the east of the railroad consisted of sterile uplands through which winding country roads offered continuous obstacles to the rapid advance of an army. Precisely for this reason Rosecrans chose the latter route for one of his corps, while the other two corps were directed against the center of the line at Tullahoma. Sending his supply trains out on the Shelbyville road, the cavalry under Stanley was ordered to Eagleville, twenty miles west, and a little south of Murfreesboro', with orders to advance on Shelbyville on the 24th of June in bold array, and at night to fill the country to their rear with camp-fires extending from Hardee's left to the Shelbyville road and beyond, indicating the presence of a heavy infantry force in his sup, port. This ruse had the desired effect, and held Hardee at Shelbyville, while the real movement was against his right.

This advance was made by Hoover's Gap* in front of Tullahoma, and to this end Colonel J. G. Wilder, in command of his splendid brigade of mounted infantry, was ordered to "trot through the gap," pushing the Confederate pickets before him, while Thomas was directed to follow as closely in his rear as possible. Wilder obeyed his orders literally, paying no attention to the frequent stands made by the retiring pickets, but driving them back upon their reserves, who in turn fell back upon Stewart's division, posted on the Garrison Fork of Elk River, which is about four miles south of Tullahoma. General Stewart sent Bushrod Johnson's brigade forward, and a brisk fight ensued. The head of Thomas's column was six miles in the rear, but Wilder's plucky regiments used their Spencer rifles to such good purpose as to hold their ground until Reynolds's division secured possession of tho bridge, when Stewart, finding that the movement was really an advance in force, that the Gap he was posted to guard was lost, and that a heavy infantry column was crossing the bridge, fell back upon the main line.

Thomas was followed closely by McCook with the Twentieth Corps, Granger with the Reserve Corps holding the ground in front of Murfreesboro'. Meantime, Crittenden with the Twenty-first Corps, who had seventeen miles to march, over a road that seemingly had no bottom, was toiling through the mud between Woodbury and Manchester on his way to his position before Bragg's right flank and rear. Colonel John F. Miller with his brigade of Negley's division attacked Liberty Gap, and fell in a fierce fight there, badly wounded; but the

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*A range of hills dividing the waters of Duck River from the head-waters of Stone's River, about eleven miles from Murfreesboro' and running nearly east and west, is pierced by several gaps. Hoover's Gap, nearly north from Wartrace, Liberty, and Guy's Gaps, and the Railroad Gap were all guarded by heavy pickets. Cleburne's division was stationed at Wartrace, and Stewart's division held possession of Hoover's Gap and the bridge over the Garrison fork of Duck River five or six miles north of Tullahoma.-EDITORS.
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Page 637

Gap was held by the brigade until relieved by the Twentieth Corps, which then passed Thomas and took the lead on the Manchester road, both corps camping within two miles of Tullahoma. In front of Stanley, Guy's Gap, held by a battery supported by cavalry, was charged, driving the Confederates toward Shelbyville, near which town they made a stand ; but Colonel Minty attacked them on the left with the 4th Regular Cavalry of his brigade, sabering the gunners and pursuing the remainder through the town.

Bragg had ordered Hardee to the support of Polk's threatened left flank, leaving Shelbyville with its elaborately planned fortifications to fall before a cavalry charge after a brief struggle by the rear-guard.

The unforeseen inclemency of the weather retarded Crittenden's advance to such an extent that, notwithstanding the continued exertions of both officers and men, he was four days in marching seventeen miles. Horses and mules, floundering in the mud, were unhitched, and artillery and ammunition wagons dragged through deep morasses by the infantry. In some places mules perished in the mud, unable to extricate themselves. But for the heavy rains Crittenden would have joined McCook and Thomas two days earlier, and the campaign might have had a different ending.

When he came up, line of battle was formed fronting the works at Tullahoma, to mask a flank movement through the woods to Elk River Bridge, four miles in rear of  Bragg's position. Between the lines the treacherous soil was filled with quicksand, which only needed the soaking of the week's rain to render it impassable. To advance against the Confederate works over this ground, through a dense abatis of tangled tree-tops, in the face of a storm of grape-shot and minie-balls, would have been to doom one-half the army to destruction. Finding, when too late, that the advance against Hardee was only a feint to cover the real movement upon his left and rear, and alive to the paramount importance of protecting Chattanooga, General Bragg again faced his army southward, and crossed the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, the mouth of Battle Creek, and at Kelley's Ferry. The advance of the column against Elk River Bridge arrived in time to witness the crossing of the rear of Bragg's army, and on the afternoon of the 3d of July Sheridan's division occupied Tullahoma.*

* The Union loss aggregated 84 killed, 473 wounded, and 13 captured or missing = 570. The Confederate loss is only partially reported. In Liddell's, Bushrod Johnson's, and Bate's brigades the casualties amounted to 50 killed, 228 wounded, aud 23 missing = 291. The loss in other commands is not indicated.-EDITORS.